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FROM CREATIONISM TO ECONOMICS
HOW FAR SHOULD ANALYSES OF PSEUDOSCIENCE EXTEND?
TAner edis
Both the scientific and philosophical problems with classic pseudosciences such as astrology and 
creationism are well known, leading to institutions that are not structured to promote cognitive 
advancement. A focus on institutions, however, also encourages recognition of gray areas, such as 
parapsychology, which combines scientifically dubious claims with institutions that are comparable 
to most social sciences in their structure. Furthermore, institutional approaches to pseudoscience 
also raise questions about some academically mainstream fields such as economics. In such cases, 
pseudoscientific aspects of practice are harder to identify, highlighting the need to place analyses of 
pseudoscience in a wider context of institutional pathologies.
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■■ CLASSIC CASES
We know what is wrong with the classic 
pseudosciences. If, for example, astrology is supposed 
to be more than an intriguing set of psychological 
metaphors, it does not work. According to the best 
of modern science, there is no plausible way for the 
planets to affect our personalities or the destinies of 
kingdoms in the way astrologers have imagined. When 
put to the proper tests, astrology does not reveal any 
signal beyond the noise. Moreover, 
it is hard to identify a consistent 
body of knowledge that can be 
called astrology. Critics encounter 
a shifting, often contradictory 
body of claims that share family 
resemblances and historical links, 
but which do not fit any narrative 
of progress or learning. 
Other classic pseudosciences 
often share little with astrology 
other than their rejection by mainstream science. Still, 
they can exhibit common pathologies. Homeopathy 
also contradicts established physical science, has 
largely failed controlled tests, and is embedded in an 
overall conception of nature that is outdated at best. 
Defenders of homeopathy, no less than astrologers, 
have to resort to ever-more inventive excuses to 
explain away failure.
This is not to say that philosophers of science 
have established solid demarcation criteria, or that 
there is much hope of constructing an eight-point 
checklist to reliably distinguish real from pretend 
science. Scientists themselves still like to accuse 
pseudosciences of being unfalsifiable. But while 
some astrologers may be remarkably adept at 
making excuses for failure, the claims of astrology 
have very often been found to be false. And it 
has been decades since philosophers have been 
tempted to make falsifiability a 
centerpiece of their understanding 
of science. Homeopathy would 
make most sense in a world 
that works according to magical 
correspondences rather than 
material mechanisms. But we 
cannot define science to exclude 
magic. If we did, homeopaths 
would rightly complain that 
science would blind itself to an 
important possibility for how the world might be 
structured. We do not have a «scientific method» 
with more substance than generalities that amount to 
saying that it is good to have some reality testing and 
that we regularly need to refine our understanding 
by subjecting claims to criticism. Pseudosciences 
fail to be science, but that is not because they do not 
conform to a set of rules that are etched in stone.
«PSEUDOSCIENCES ARE 
TYPICALLY PROTECTIVE 
AND APOLOGETIC, RATHER 
THAN STRUCTURED TO 
ADVANCE LEARNING»
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And yet, it remains important to distinguish 
between real science and the fake versions (Pigliucci 
& Boudry, 2013). Today, when patients spend many 
billions of dollars on alternative medicine, and when 
mainstream medical institutions increasingly adopt 
«complementary» medical practices, separating 
real science-based medicine from quackery is an 
important public concern. In the United States and 
many Muslim countries – even, to a lesser extent, 
in Europe – varieties of creationism remain very 
popular in conservative religious communities, 
resulting in considerable pressure on public science 
education (Blancke, Hjermitslev, & Kjaergaard, 2014; 
Edis, 2007). Even if our analysis has to be more 
complicated than consulting a set of pre-established 
criteria, we have to engage in debates to negotiate 
what kind of claims and what institutions we trust.
So, with anti-evolutionary views such as 
creationism or intelligent design, we argue, first and 
foremost, that evolution is far more successful as 
an explanation. If we are tempted to use the term 
pseudoscience for a set of claims, this is almost 
always because by current scientific standards these 
claims appear to fail, but a community of advocates 
persist in arguing that if done properly, science would 
acknowledge that they are correct. The first thing that 
is wrong about creationism is that 
it is bad science or «dead science» 
(Kitcher, 2007) – our geology 
is not shaped by Noah’s Flood, 
fossils are not hydrodynamically 
sorted, and evolutionary biologists 
are not concealing a crisis brought 
on by a lack of transitional forms. 
Some variants of a pseudoscience 
can raise interesting questions; 
when intelligent design first 
appeared as a more sophisticated 
form of creationism, there was 
some intellectual value in finding 
out exactly how it went wrong. 
But now, we know that intelligent design advocates’ 
attempts to establish a mathematically rigorous 
procedure to detect designs that cannot be achieved 
by mindless natural processes do not work (Young 
& Edis, 2004). Mainstream science is perfectly well 
equipped to consider challenges to evolution. The 
challenge, so far, has failed.
Critics who examine anti-evolution movements 
soon find that there is more to creationism than 
a stubborn attachment to a failed explanation. 
Creationists are rooted in religious communities, 
and operate within institutions that attempt to 
rival scientific institutions. The 
Institute for Creation Research 
or the Discovery Institute 
do not just provide desks for 
PhD’s who dissent from the 
current consensus. They are 
focal points for networks of 
alternative scholarship, public 
communication, and political 
action. Creationists can be very 
ingenious in excusing failure, 
arguing, for example, that 
radiometric dating cannot be 
trusted either because Noah’s 
Flood invalidates the assumption 
of constant decay rates, or because of whatever excuse 
is fashionable at the moment. Now, the specific claims 
made to defend flood geology are very likely false. 
But the institutions of creationism are structured to 
protect core creationist convictions from criticism. 
Creationists defend explicit supernatural interventions, 
coming into conflict with much of natural science. 
Their mistake, however, is not a violation of any 
rules that dictate methodological naturalism (Boudry, 
Blancke, & Braeckman, 2012). Instead, it is how they 
are not able to recognize the failures of their preferred 
approach. Creationist institutions are structured to 
Classical pseudosciences such as astrology are easy to identify, but 
other fields such as psychical research and parapsychology remain 
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help conservative religious people remain steadfast in 
their faith, and not to help them learn about how the 
world works.
The label pseudoscience, then, does not just 
stand for scientific failure. Failure is common, and 
it is very much part of the processes of science. 
Properly used, pseudoscience applies to institutions 
more than ideas. Pseudosciences institutionalize 
intellectual pathologies, which 
systematically mislead their 
communities about the world. 
They are typically protective and 
apologetic, rather than structured 
to advance learning. Very often, 
pseudoscientific institutions 
are set apart from established 
scholarly and academic 
institutions, existing in parallel 
while harboring ambitions to 
supplant what they perceive as a 
corrupt mainstream.
We do reasonably well in identifying parallel 
institutions and popular movements that are not 
structured to advance learning. In academic settings, 
we are usually well equipped to recognize the 
problems with everything from Holocaust denial to 
alien abductions. Moreover, we also have skeptic 
movements that act partly as a public extension of 
mainstream scientific institutions, partly as consumer 
protection advocates. Public persuasion is not always 
easy, since pseudoscientific institutions are often built 
around intuitively compelling ideas, while modern 
science has tended to draw a picture of our world that 
is fundamentally counterintuitive 
and harder to understand. 
Nonetheless, for those of us who 
prefer our public debates to be 
influenced by science rather than 
rival institutions, identifying 
pseudoscience is not often 
difficult. Doing something about it 
is another matter.
■■ GRAY AREAS
If accusations of pseudoscience 
are most meaningful in the context of institutions, 
we should, besides classic cases such as creationism, 
also find more ambiguous enterprises. For example, 
psychical research and parapsychology has long 
occupied a gray area at the boundaries of scientific 
respectability.
Claims of psychic powers do not fit well with what 
we have learned from natural science. Indeed, the 
very attraction of parapsychology is that it promises 
a revolution in our understanding of the world. As 
with many classic pseudosciences, parapsychology 
is closely associated with a magical, anti-materialist 
intellectual tradition; it is a dualist research program. 
However, aside from the conviction that materialist 
approaches to minds such as cognitive neuroscience 
are off the mark, there is little theoretical content 
to parapsychology. Indeed, a persistent criticism of 
parapsychology is that due to its lack of substantive 
theory, its alleged phenomena are negatively defined 
as violations of mainstream theoretical expectations. 
If clear, clean violations were to be observed – large 
effect sizes and repeatable phenomena – this negative 
definition would not be a significant obstacle. But the 
marginal, elusive consciousness-related anomalies 
claimed by experimental parapsychologists are 
not so easily interpretable as violations. Critics 
of parapsychology have long pointed out specific 
technical errors in parapsychological work, and 
have observed problems such as effect sizes that 
decline with tighter controls, general inconsistencies 
in reported effect sizes, methodological defects 
that range from very subtle concerns to insufficient 
Parapsychology has close links with conventional scientific 
organizations. To gain acceptance, some psychical researchers 
adopt formal research methods, form professional associations, 
and are even supported by academic institutions. For example, 
the Department of Psychology at Edinburgh University has had a 
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safeguards against self-deception or fraud, a lack 
of replicability, and the failure to produce a clear 
record of cognitive progress after well over a century 
of investigation. All of this adds up to a research 
program that produces alleged signals that fail 
to rise above the noise expected from a complex 
experimental environment with innumerable and 
hard to control «small» sources of error that can 
masquerade as genuine anomalies (Edis, 2002).
If such criticism is correct, however, it would only 
mean that psychic powers are a failed hypothesis. 
Mainstream science is well-acquainted with long-
running but unproductive research programs. String 
theory in physics, for example, has not been very 
fruitful yet, but it has few plausible rivals and 
is tightly linked to well-established theoretical 
approaches. Until recently, the effort to detect 
gravitational waves faced many difficulties due to 
extremely small effect sizes, though physicists had 
very precise expectations about the effects themselves. 
Parapsychology is more revolutionary with a 
far weaker theoretical basis and far less indirect 
empirical support. Its prospects for future success 
may well be judged to be dismal.
But failure is normal in science. If critics suspect 
a pseudoscientific element in parapsychology, it must 
be because of institutional features that promote an 
unreasonable persistence with failure. For example, 
parapsychology shows many signs of indulging in 
excuse-making to avoid the consequences of failure. 
Psychical research has a history of generating 
excuses such as the presence of skeptics and tighter 
controls psychically inhibiting psychic phenomena. 
Moreover, many prominent parapsychologists explain 
their rejection by mainstream science as due to 
prejudice: the dominance of scientism and ideological 
commitments to materialism (Tart, 2009). As with 
the classic pseudosciences, such rhetoric is often 
a sign of intellectual insularity and retreat into a 
parallel institutional culture. Parapsychology is often 
associated with a quasi-religious New Age subculture, 
and its popular appeal far outstrips its scientific 
reputation.
And yet, parapsychology also has strong 
connections to mainstream scientific institutions. 
Historically, psychical research has attracted many 
scientists; even today, a prominent scientist or 
two will regularly become convinced that there 
is something to parapsychology, only for their 
arguments to be forgotten in the following decades. 
To become more acceptable to mainstream science, 
psychical researchers have attempted to become 
more rigorous, more formally experimental. Indeed, 
William Miller. The Deluge, 1844. Recorded for The imperial family 
bible (Blackie & Son, 1844). The development of excuses to justify 
failures is a common pathology in many pseudosciences. Some 
creationists, for example, argue that radiometric dating cannot be 
relied upon because the universal flood invalidates the hypothesis 
of constant decay rates.
«THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF ECONOMICS 
IS A MATTER FOR REGULAR DEBATE 
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today the process of conducting experimental 
parapsychology is almost boringly mainstream. 
Researchers perform studies that are well-controlled 
by social-scientific standards, certainly to the extent 
that funding allows. They produce sophisticated 
statistical analyses and meta-analyses. They report 
their results in professional journals, employing 
the standard passive and style-free prose. And they 
complain about insufficient funding in meetings 
arranged by professional associations, all of which 
look very much like the institutions associated with 
other academic forms of inquiry.
Now, especially when judged by the standards of 
physical science, revolutionary claims that there are 
psychic powers or disembodied spirits or even just 
a certain class of consciousness-related anomalies 
still look like failures. But deep institutional 
pathologies are harder to identify. We know how to 
identify classic pseudosciences such as astrology 
or creationism, but parapsychology falls into a gray 
area. The widespread public fascination with psychic 
powers is not supported by mainstream science. But 
it is hard to say that parapsychology represents any 
threat to science education or enjoys undue influence 
on public policy.
■■ PSEUDOSCIENCE IN THE MAINSTREAM?
If pseudosciences are complicated, we should 
expect to find more gray areas – overlaps between 
intellectual and institutional pathologies and 
mainstream respectability. Indeed, a focus on 
institutional practices also raises the question of 
whether respectability carries too much weight. 
Critics of pseudoscience are often accused of 
conservatism: favoring established institutions and 
defending a rigid orthodoxy. We should also be able 
to ask whether respectable academic institutions are 
really structured to advance learning.
Accusations of pseudoscientific practice directed 
against mainstream enterprises, though uncommon, 
are not entirely unusual. Most fields of inquiry 
have controversial areas that inspire suspicions 
of systematic intellectual malpractice. In physics, 
for example, string theorists have been charged 
with indulging in unfalsifiability – of pursuing 
mathematically elegant theories without subjecting 
them to proper experimental constraints. In response, 
some philosophers have defended notions of «non-
empirical theory confirmation», which has started a 
side controversy of its own (Dawid, 2013). But in any 
case, all physicists acknowledge that unconfirmed 
ideas such as string theory are not ready for 
introductory textbooks. The institutions of physics are 
hardly corrupt.
For more interesting targets, we might investigate 
less-mature sciences that are more susceptible 
to outside influences. For example, the currently 
dominant form of economics has regularly been 
accused of being a pseudoscience. Academic studies 
of economics obviously play an ideological as 
well as analytical role in modern societies, which 
reinforces suspicions that economic ideas sit 
uncomfortably close to political propaganda. And 
since the economics profession produces policy 
recommendations, its failures are both more 
consequential than those of classic pseudosciences 
and come under broader scrutiny.
Since the financial crises that started out the 
twenty-first century, public skepticism about 
economics has become more commonplace. Not only 
did mainstream economists largely fail to anticipate 
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the crisis of 2008, but their dismal performance 
was linked to their reliance on elegant and complex 
mathematical models that nevertheless treated finance 
very naively in today’s financialized economies 
(Smith, 2010). Commitments to frictionless free 
markets in equilibrium overlay real economies 
that have been far from equilibrium and riddled 
with market failures. And while post-crisis critics 
of mainstream economics often concentrated 
on technical problems, some also accused the 
dominant current of the economics profession of 
pseudoscientific practices. For example, economic 
models depend on simplifying assumptions that 
are, in contrast to mature sciences such as physics, 
clearly not realistic. However, economics also has 
a supply of arguments to the effect that unrealistic 
oversimplifications do not matter. To a critic, this may 
look like the sort of excuse-making characteristic of 
pseudoscientific institutions (Keen, 2011).
The scientific status of economics is also a matter 
for regular debate among philosophers of economics 
and social scientists critical of the intellectual 
insularity of economics. At least one philosopher 
of science with a special interest in questions of 
pseudoscience has described neoclassical economics 
as a pseudoscience (Bunge, 2016). Partly in response 
to the criticism directed toward their profession, 
some economists have lately begun to describe their 
work as more like a craft than a science, primarily 
useful for specific policy decisions rather than more 
ambitious forms of explanation and prediction.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that economics is 
so similar to the classic pseudosciences. Today’s 
neoliberal economic doctrines are closely associated 
with political philosophies that exhibit overconfidence 
in their praise for the magic of the market and the 
wisdom of crowds (Mirowski, 2014). But this is not 
the kind of literal supernaturalism and purpose-
infused perception of nature that is so common in 
the classic pseudosciences. Fantasies of endless 
growth run up against physical limitations, but that 
says very little about the accuracy of models with 
shorter horizons in time and space. Unlike the classic 
pseudosciences, which clash with very successful 
established theoretical frameworks in natural science, 
mainstream economics does not face any rival 
with comparable intellectual weight. Criticisms of 
mainstream ideas, even if accurate, have not yet been 
woven into a coherent alternative that can be shown to 
perform better.
Partly as a consequence, dissident economists 
have a far weaker institutional position than their 
mainstream colleagues. Orthodox economics enjoys 
Long and unproductive research programs are common in the 
scientific world. Until recently, the gravitational wave detection 
program faced many difficulties due to the extremely small scope 
of its effects. However, physicists had very precise expectations 
of the effects themselves, based on Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity. These would finally be confirmed with the gravitational 
wave detected by the LIGO observatory in September 2015. In 
the image, a simulation of two black holes merging made by 
NASA in 2008.
«WE STILL HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO 
TO UNDERSTAND PSEUDOSCIENCE 
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all the trappings of institutional respectability: 
numbers, funding, and prestige. The journals, 
academic practices, and professional associations of 
economists are as well-established as it is possible 
to be. Dissidents, in contrast, are gathered in low-
profile academic departments with little funding or 
influence. As a result, if there is any institutional 
critique of economics to be made, it cannot be too 
similar to that of the classic pseudosciences. If we use 
mainstream academic respectability as a proxy for 
a healthy intellectual enterprise, economics will be 
immune from criticism. But respectability alone does 
not answer the question of whether the institutions of 
economics are in fact structured to promote learning 
about how real economies function. 
So, if we try to apply what we know from the 
classic pseudosciences to controversies over the status 
of economics, we find ourselves in another gray area. 
More important, examples such as economics reveal 
limitations in analyses of science and pseudoscience. 
Institutions are complex, and our experience with the 
classic pseudosciences produces an emphasis on a 
limited set of possible pathologies, such as generating 
excuses to avoid persistent failure. But if economics 
suffers from any institutional pathologies, these 
need not be those defects exhibited by beleaguered 
advocates of minority viewpoints rejected by 
the scientific mainstream. If economics has 
institutionalized some obstacles to cognitive progress, 
these are more likely due to its favored position and 
services to the already powerful. If economists have 
any similarity to astrologers, it will be to the court 
astrologers of old rather than the marginal New Age 
entrepreneurs of today.
We know what is wrong with the classic 
pseudosciences, but if diagnoses of pseudoscience 
are to be useful beyond the restricted set of such 
examples, more needs to be done. In particular, 
we still have much work to do to understand 
pseudoscience in a wider context of possible 
institutional failings. Without such an understanding, 
outside of conversations about paranormal beliefs, 
accusations of «pseudoscience» will risk becoming 
an empty rhetorical device. And without an 
acknowledgement of possible structural problems 
in mainstream academic institutions, critics of 
pseudoscience will indeed be exhibiting undue 
conservatism. 
REFERENCES
Blancke, S., Hjermitslev, H. H., & Kjaergaard, P. C. (Eds.). (2014). 
Creationism in Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Boudry, M., Blancke, S., & Braeckman, J. (2012). Grist to the mill of 
anti-evolutionism: The failed strategy of ruling the supernatural out of 
science by philosophical fiat. Science & Education, 21(8), 1151–1165. doi: 
10.1007/s11191-012-9446-8 
Bunge, M. (2016). Between two worlds: Memoirs of a philosopher-scientist. 
Cham: Springer International.
Dawid, R. (2013). String theory and the scientific method. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Edis, T. (2002). The ghost in the universe: God in light of modern science. 
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Edis, T. (2007). An illusion of harmony: Science and religion in Islam. 
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Keen, S. (2011). Debunking economics: The naked emperor dethroned? 
London/New York: Zed Books.
Kitcher, P. (2007). Living with Darwin: Evolution, design, and the future of 
faith. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Mirowski, P. (2014). Never let a serious crisis go to waste: How 
neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown. London: Verso.
Pigliucci, M., & Boudry, M. (Eds.). (2013). Philosophy of pseudoscience: 
Reconsidering the demarcation problem. Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Smith, Y. (2010). ECONned: How unenlightened self interest undermined 
democracy and corrupted capitalism. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Tart, C. T. (2009). The end of materialism: How evidence of the 
paranormal is bringing science and spirit together. Oakland, CA: New 
Harbinger Publications.
Young, M., & Edis, T. (Eds.). (2004). Why intelligent design fails: A 
scientific critique of the new creationism. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press.
Taner Edis. Professor at Department of Physics of Truman State University 
at Kirksville (USA). While teaching physics, Edis has had a long-standing 
interest in the history and philosophy of science. He has written numerous 
articles and books addressing questions concerning pseudoscience, anti-
evolutionary movements, and science and religion, particularly in an 
Islamic context. His latest book is Islam evolving: Radicalism, reformation, 
and the uneasy relationship with secular West.
Since the financial crises that started the twenty-first century, 
society’s skepticism about economics has become more 
commonplace. Some people accuse mainstream economics of 
pseudoscientific practices. In the image, citizens of Seattle (USA) 
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